Veterinarians play a central role in understanding and managing infectious diseases. Since more than 75% of newly emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic (Jones et al., 2008; cited by Gavi), the likelihood is high that the first signals of a potential outbreak appear in animal populations. In many instances, veterinarians working with livestock, companion animals, and wildlife are among the earliest professionals to observe unusual clinical signs, unexplained mortality events, or shifting disease patterns. In scenarios involving a novel pathogen with zoonotic potential or “Disease X”, veterinarians are not only the first to detect these warning signs but may also be among the first occupational groups exposed to infection due to their close and frequent contact with animals. Historical evidence from outbreaks such as Nipah virus, Ebola, and Hendra virus underscores this heightened frontline vulnerability (Quammen, 2012; Mendez et al., 2012; Halpin & Rota, 2015).

Veterinarians play a critical role in understanding and addressing the intersection of animal, human, and environmental health. From antimicrobial resistance and food safety and security to zoonotic disease research and ecological and environmental research, veterinarians are well-equipped for infection control and surveillance from a One Health perspective. (Gibbs & Gibbs, 2012). As stated earlier, AMR stands at the heart of the One Health framework; the example of Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) can help further clarify how different fields of health professions are intertwined with the central theme of One Health.

Biomedical scientists are the diagnostic and analytical backbone of the One Health movement, occupying a critical space between clinical observation and public health action. Through laboratory surveillance, pathogen characterisation, and the development of rapid diagnostic assays, they generate the high-quality data that clinicians, veterinarians, and policymakers need to respond effectively to emerging threats. Nowhere is this more visible than in genomic surveillance for AMR: whole-genome sequencing (WGS) and metagenomics now allow biomedical scientists to simultaneously track resistance genes across human, animal, and environmental reservoirs, revealing transmission pathways that would be impossible to detect in any single sector working in isolation (Djordjevic et al., 2024; Muloi et al., 2023). A concrete illustration of this integrative function is the SIEGA framework in Andalusia, Spain, where integrated genomic sequencing of pathogens derived from clinical, veterinary, and environmental samples is directly linked to real-time clinical decision-making, demonstrating how bench science can and should inform bedside care (Casimiro-Soriguer et al., 2024). Critically, this bridging role is not passive: by standardising methodologies across sectors and contributing to shared global databases, biomedical scientists help close the fragmentation gap that currently limits coordinated AMR surveillance at the One Health interface (Muloi et al., 2023).

These findings reinforce the urgent need for integrated surveillance systems, coordinated antimicrobial stewardship, and food security efforts that transcend traditional professional and sectoral boundaries. Without a comprehensive One Health approach-encompassing cross-sector collaboration, policy alignment, robust surveillance, and public education-AMR will continue to compromise healthcare systems, increase mortality, impose substantial economic burdens, and erode decades of progress in infection control (WHO, 2024; McEwen & Collignon, 2018). Thus, AMR is fundamentally transforming how medicine is practised and how health systems function, affecting both animal and human medicine. Strengthening laboratory surveillance systems, implementing molecular tracking of resistance determinants, and developing robust diagnostic assays are essential not only to save lives but also to curb the progression of what is increasingly recognised as the “silent pandemic” of AMR. 

If the past century of medicine was defined by specialisation, the next may be defined by integration. Many of the most pressing health challenges today are not failures of clinical knowledge but failures of coordination. Medical contributions to One Health span multiple domains, including clinical practice, surveillance systems, education, research, and policy implementation. Integrated surveillance responses constitute a primary contribution, with examples including the Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance (CIPARS), which reduces time to detection of new antimicrobial resistance, and the Human Animal Infection and Risk Surveillance Groups (HAIRS) in the UK, which facilitates interdisciplinary relationships and horizon scanning for zoonotic infections (Zinsstag et al., 2023).

Medical education has been slower than veterinary training to integrate One Health principles, leaving many clinicians with limited environmental health literacy and cross-sector awareness (Rabinowitz et al., 2017).  But the problem goes beyond gaps in education. Poor coordination between countries, disconnected national systems, and separate monitoring structures make real collaboration between sectors difficult in practice. Even when the need for collaboration is widely acknowledged, deeply entrenched specialisation and packed training programs make integration difficult. One Health is recognised as essential, yet structurally and culturally, medicine is still catching up (Machalaba et al., 2021). 

Evidence of outcomes from medical engagement in One Health demonstrates both health improvements and system efficiencies. Studies across diverse settings provide concrete evidence that One Health approaches are central to the sustainability of the medical field through four interconnected mechanisms:

• surveillance and early detection of zoonotic diseases,

• tackling antimicrobial resistance (AMR),

• environmental health management,

• and food safety and security.

Hong Kong’s coordinated avian influenza response eliminated 1.5 million poultry in five days, resulting in no major human H5N1 outbreaks in Hong Kong for over a decade following the response, and only rare sporadic cases since 1997 (Sims & Peiris, 2012), while Kerala, India, demonstrated sustained outbreak capacity when its 2019 Nipah response achieved zero spread and mortality compared to the 2018 outbreak (Singhai et al., 2021). A joint working committee incorporating diverse professionals to tackle the health issue from a One Health perspective, and cross-sector training and proper Integrated data platforms are a need of the time. Thus, in that sense, One Health is not an adjunct to medicine; it may become central to its sustainability.